T he Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) was established in 1999 with the specific responsibility to investigate and prosecute cases of organised crime and corruption. The DSO, also known as the Scorpions, was located in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to allow for prosecutor-led investigations. Within no time the Scorpions were involved in a number of high-level investigations involving the political and economic elite of South Africa. The perceived success of their investigations, particularly against high-ranking public officials, brought them a measure of public support. However, repeated media leaks about their investigations and allegations of abuse of power in the exercise of search warrants (particularly in the Jacob Zuma case), led to criticism from politicians who felt that the Scorpions were being used to influence the outcome of the power struggle between President Thabo Mbeki and Zuma in the ANC.
In 2005 the legality of the Scorpions' mandate was called into question and problems were raised about the apparently strained relationship between the The Commission was tasked with the responsibility of obtaining clarification on the location, mandate and operation of the DSO vis-à-vis other relevant government departments or institutions (Khampepe 2006: 6-7) .
Selected extracts
It is against this background that the Khampepe report presents an overview, findings and recommendations on eleven key issues. These are: 1. The rationale for the establishment of the DSO 2. The legislative mandate of the DSO 3. Systems for management and control of the DSO 4. Systems for communication of the DSO 5. Oversight and accountability in respect of intelligence and related operations of the DSO 6. Constitutional and legislative mandates of the SAPS 7. Systems for co-ordination and co-operation between the SAPS, intelligence agencies and the DSO 8. The effectiveness and efficiency of co-ordination of intelligence: DSO/SAPS/NIA 9. The efficacy of co-ordinating systems that exist between the intelligence agencies 10. Training or further training on policing or investigating methods 11 The impact of locating investigators and prosecutors within the National Prosecuting Authority
As will be highlighted in the summaries that follow, one of the key themes that cuts across the report concerns the presence, or not, of links between the work of the DSO and SAPS in the fight against crime. The article will focus on selected aspects of the report that best explain the position of the Commission with regard to the location, mandate and operation of the DSO.
The rationale for the establishment of the DSO The Khampepe Commission report highlights four principal reasons behind the establishment of the DSO. These are the perceived incapacity of the SAPS to investigate high-level priority crimes, the need to develop a multi-disciplinary approach in the fight against corruption, the need to establish an entity that would be able to attract and retain highly skilled personnel, and lastly, the perceived criminal justice system and from the intelligence community. The report highlights the fact that the legislature intentionally drafted the legal mandate of the DSO to be wide and argues that this was prudent. This is based on the fact that organised crime syndicates are not only pervasive, but that they are also are highly sophisticated and command huge financial resources that enable them to mount heavyweight legal defences with a view to resisting prosecutions and/or convictions. (Khampepe 2006:39) . Khampepe argues that an overly prescriptive legal mandate would have led to constant judicial attacks and would have frustrated the DSO's ability to fulfill its mandate.
The report goes on to insist that 'there is nothing impermissible in law to draft the legal mandate of the DSO to be as broad as it appears in the NPA Act' (Khampepe 2006:40) . In addition, the report argues that there is nothing unconstitutional in the DSO sharing the mandate to tackle organised crime with the SAPS, but acknowledges that the proper management of tensions that may arise from a shared mandate is a challenge.
However, the report does raise concerns about the conduct of the DSO. Based on evidence and arguments made before the Commission, the report reveals that the implementation of the legal mandate of the DSO was not entirely satisfactory. In particular, the leaking of information to the media was identified as a problem. The report notes that when the subject matter of DSO investigations is published it can lead to the prejudice of the persons under investigation. Besides indicating an abuse of power by the DSO, this may also point to a possible violation of the rights and freedoms protected under the Bill of Rights (Khampepe 2006:11) . Here the Commission found that the DSO tended to go beyond its 'information' gathering mandate to include intelligence gathering (also see section 24 below).
In an attempt to come to terms with some of the scathing criticisms that have been levelled against the DSO, section 15 (Findings in relation to the evaluation of the implementation of the legislative mandate of the DSO) suggests that this might be because the DSO is better resourced than the SAPS and also has the 'unfair' advantage of being able to select cases for its investigations. The Commission believed that this gave rise to a competitive environment and caused conflict and tensions between the DSO and the SAPS.
The Commission critically questioned the role of the Ministerial Co-ordinating Committee (MCC) which was intended (in the NPA Act) to address a number of issues relating to the functioning of the DSO. Sub-section 15.1 points out that the MCC did not properly discharge its responsibility under the Act and that it therefore also failed to avert or mitigate some of the problems between the SAPS and the DSO. Systems for co-ordination and co-operation between SAPS, intelligence agencies and the DSO Sections 30-31 of the report deal with the findings and recommendations concerning the systems for co-ordination and operation between the SAPS, intelligence agencies and the DSO. Here it becomes evident that there were no systems of co-ordination and co-operation between the DSO and the SAPS. The report recommends that the DSO should form part of the family of law enforcement structures and share expertise and information for an overall effective crime combating strategy.
Training or further training on policing or investigating methods
The Commission's concerns over the absence of cooperation and co-ordination between the DSO and SAPS find further expression in sections 39 and 40 that deal with issues of training. In accordance with proponents of the view that the DSO has been far better resourced than the SAPS, the report argues that the Commercial Organised Crime Unit of the SAPS, which has related responsibilities, should be furnished with the same equipment, resources and legal powers in order to emulate the successes of the DSO. The report goes on to state that, given the lack of effective cooperation between and coordination of the activities of the DSO and the SAPS, it is inescapable that there may be duplication in the resources both institutions channel towards training. The recommendation here is that 'the DSO and the SAPS streamline the training of their personnel to achieve greater efficiencies' (Khampepe 2006:92) .
Location of investigators and prosecutors within the NPA As previously indicated in this summary of the Khampepe Commission Report, it is evident that one of the contentious issues that has characterised the debate on the Scorpions includes the location of investigators and prosecutors within the NPA. Opponents of this -including the SAPS -have argued that it is unsound to locate investigators and prosecutors under one roof. The logical conclusion to this would be that prosecutors should remain within the prosecuting authority and the law enforcement officers redeployed back to the SAPS (Khampepe 2006:93) . The argument apparently hinged on the assumption that the presence of prosecutors and investigators under one roof could compromise the activities of the prosecutors.
Despite this, the report draws attention to the use of multi-disciplinary structures, that is, having prosecutors, intelligence operatives or analysts as well as investigators in a team, in foreign jurisdictions. In countries such as the USA, multidisciplinary structures ('Strike Forces') are created for specific purposes with various elements within it reporting to their respective authorities. The report also provides the examples of England and Wales, where the Serious Organised Crime Agency is a multi-disciplinary structure yet does not fall under the Crown Prosecution Service.
Although the report notes concerns that the inclusion of prosecutors in the DSO investigating teams could compromise their independence it nevertheless argues that the various disciplines within the DSO should remain under a single command structure. This is based on the view that the structure of the DSO enhances closer cooperation among the various disciplines, as the prosecutors and the investigators benefit from one another's expertise, thereby making crosspollination an effective strategy in combating crime and returning higher conviction ratios. • The threat that organised crime presents to the democratic institutions and economic integrity of the country poses a formidable challenge that will continually require creative and determined strategies to address. These strategies will include, by definition, enhanced co-operation among the various law enforcement structures whose primary constitutional responsibility it is to secure the country and its people.
Location of the DSO
investigations were to be prosecution-led, thus it could only be located within the prosecuting authority, which constitutionally is authorised to institute prosecutions.
However, the report draws attention to the fact that (sub-section 47.3) the SAPS and the DSO still did not appreciate the legal imperative for co-operation. The Commission called for decisive executive action to compel a realignment of attitudes by these institutions. One of these actions would be to transfer political oversight and responsibility over to the law enforcement component of the DSO to the Minister of Safety and Security. Still the Commission insisted that the DSO should continue to be located within the NPA.
Conclusion
The Report of the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry into the mandate of the Directorate of Special Operations concludes with the following key four points, contained in sections 53, 54, 55 and 56 respectively (Khampepe 2006:112):
• The inexorable quest for an effective and efficient strategy to tackle organised crime must run like a golden thread through the whole tapestry of the law enforcement/prosecutorial and intelligence structures. The attainment and maintenance of that efficacy is dependent on the law enforcement/prosecutorial structures cooperating and coordinating their activities closely with one another as well as with the requisite statutory intelligence structures.
• The imperfections in the inter-relationship of the law enforcement structures including the relationship of the DSO with such structures giving rise to the establishment of the Commission derive largely to operational matters. It is necessary therefore to create -on an ongoing basis -a review mechanism to manage the constant challenges that may arise in the execution of the work of these structures.
• The report deals with various aspects that would require the Legislature's consideration to give effect to these recommendations and to harmonise the implementation of these
